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Asset Purchasers as Potentially 
Responsible Parties Under Superfund* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether or not asset purchasers can be held liable under "Superfund" 
has been a source of much litigation in the past few years. The debate has 
centered on the conflict between successor liability under traditional 
common law and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) desire to 
expand successor liability beyond the common law. 1 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has not ruled on this issue, as it pertains to Superfund, and the Cir-
cuit Courts are divided in their rulings. 2 This Comment will argue in favor 
of the traditional approach and against the EPA's expansive approach. Part 
II will establish the background and history of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) as it 
relates to traditional corporate law. In addition, it will discuss the EPA's 
attempt to expand the list of potentially responsible parties under 
CERCLA. Part III will discuss the general rule that asset purchasers are 
not liable, under traditional corporate law, as successors in interest. Part III 
will also explore the traditional exceptions to that rule. Part N will discuss 
the history and reasoning behind the substantial continuity test as applied 
to CERCLA. Part V will analyze the various rationales and policy consid-
erations supporting the substantial continuity approach and provide argu-
ments against applying this test to CERCLA liability. Part VI will con-
clude the Comment. 
* Copyright © 1998 by Curtis J. Busby. 
1. 4 JACKSON B. BATILE & MAXINE I. LtPELES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTE 
288 (2d ed.1993) (citing C. M .. PRICE, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE SHAREHOLDERS AND SUCCESSOR 
CORPORATIONS FOR ABANDONED SITES UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, 
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT, June 13, 1984, 11-12 (hereinafter "EPA Memorandum")). 
2. Circuit cases using the Traditional common law approach include: Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 1997 WL 792675, *1 (9th Cir. 1997); Aluminum Co. of 
America v. Beazer East Inc., 124 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 1997); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm & 
Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1996); City Management Corp. v. United States Chemical Co., 43 
F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994); John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1993); 
Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991); and, Smithland & 
hnprovement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Circuit cases supporting the EPA's preferred rule (hereinafter the "substantial continuity test") 
include: B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Carolina 
Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478 (8th 
Cir. 1992); and, Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
On December 11, 1980 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), com-
monly known as "Superfund."3 CERCLA was passed in the wake of the 
Love Canal incident,4 where the Hooker Chemical and Plastics Co. had 
deposited nearly 22,000 tons of industrial waste on a sixteen acre site in 
Niagara Falls, New York. The chemical company buried the waste and 
then sold the site to the Niagara Falls Board of Education for $1. Homes 
and schools were later built on or near the site. In the mid 1970's Chemi-
cals began seeping into residential basements, and by 1979 the New York 
Commissioner of Health ordered an area of the site vacated by all families 
with pregnant women and children under the age of two. 5 
The EPA recognized that none of the then-existing environmental laws 
enabled the EPA to adequately address environmental problems like Love 
Canal which pose a public health threat. 
Congress drafted CERCLA in order to provide the EPA with a 
powerful means of responding promptly and effectively to 
cases of environmental contamination .... 
. . . CERCLA empowers the EPA to respond to the actual 
or threatened release of a hazardous substance ... by conduct-
ing the cleanup itself and suing a wide range of responsible 
parties for reimbursement .... 6 
Specifically, CERCLA lists four broad categories of "covered per-
sons" which may be held jointly and severally liable for the cost of clean 
up as Potentially Responsible Parties (PRP's).7 PRP's include: 
(1) owners and operators of vessels or facilities; 
(2) persons who at the time of disposal of hazardous 
substances owned or operated a facility where such substances 
were disposed of; 
(3) generators of hazardous substances or any person who 
arranges for their disposal or treatment; and 
( 4) transporters of waste, if they participate in the selection of 
the disposal site or facility.8 
3. PUB. L. No. 96-510, 94 STAT. 2767 (1980), codified as 26 U.S.C. § 4611 & 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601 (1997). 
4. 4 BATTLE & L!PELES, supra note I, at 179-180. 
5. /d. 
6. !d. 
7. Aluminum Company of America v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 552 (3d Cir. 1997). 
8. !d. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (1997)). 
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The consequences of being labeled a PRP can be devastating. One au-
thor likened CERCLA to a bus "carreen[ing] through the countryside and 
crush[ing] all obstacles in its way."9 
[PRPs] are strictly, jointly, and severally liable for the cost of 
cleaning up an abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste 
site. PRPs are also liable for any damages to natural resources 
resulting from the release of a hazardous substance. Courts 
construe CERCLA liability broadly and liberally so as not to 
frustrate CERCLA's major purposes or to create loopholes in 
CERCLA's liability scheme. Exceptions to CERCLA liability 
are construed narrowly. 10 
Notwithstanding its power as a tool in the EPA's hands, CERCLA is 
not without its weaknesses. For instance, "CERCLA was drafted behind 
closed doors before being passed hastily by a lame duck Congress before 
its adjournment, a process that resulted in an ambiguous and confusing 
statutory and legislative history."11 As a result, there is very little legisla-
tive history which would help explain the intent of Congress. 12 CERCLA 
was later amended and reauthorized on October 17, 1986 under the name 
of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). 13 Among 
other things, SARA increased the size of Superfund from $1.5 to $8.5 bil-
lion.14 While SARA is not as ambiguous as CERCLA, it is certainly not a 
"paradigm of clarity either."15 
As a result of this ambiguity and the enormous potential for liability, 
CERCLA and SARA have generated a tremendous amount of litigation, 
much of it centering on whether a particular party is a PRP. The litigation 
involves either the EPA seeking reimbursement from a PRP or one PRP 
seeking cost recovery or contribution from another PRP. 16 
In an effort to broaden the reach of CERCLA, the EPA has sought to 
expand the list of PRPs to include individuals or corporations who pur-
chase the assets of PRPs. In 1984 the EPA's Administrator for Enforce-
ment and Compliance Monitoring issued a memo wherein she outlined a 
policy in which the EPA would encourage the courts to adopt the more 
9. 4 8ATILE AND L!PELES, supra note I, at 179. 
10. VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, LIABILITY, AND LJT!GATION I 
(1992). 
II. /d. at5. 
12. /d. 
13. PUB. L. No. 99-499, 100 STAT. 1613 (1986), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 9601 & 10 U.S.C. 
§ 211 (1997). 
14. 4 BATILE & LIPELES, supra note I, at 182. 
15. FoGLEMAN, supra note 10, at 5. 
16. 4 BATILE & LlPELES, supra note I, at 182. 
354 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 12 
expansive substantial continuity test with regard to successor liabiiity. 17 
Essentially, this test expands liability to include purchasers of assets who 
might otherwise not be liable under traditional corporate Law. 
ill. TRADITIONAL CORPORATE LAW AND SUCCESSOR LIABILITY 
Under traditional corporate law, there is a "universally accepted gen-
eral rule that a corporation which purchases the assets of another corpora-
tion does not, simply by virtue of the asset purchase transaction, become 
liable for the obligations of the seller."18 However, there are four tradi-
tional exceptions in which an asset purchaser may be deemed liable as a 
successor if: 
(1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to 
assume the liability; 
(2) the transaction amounts to a 'de-facto' consolidation or 
merger; 
(3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the 
seller corporation; or 
(4) the transaction was fraudulently entered into in order to 
escape liability.19 
Thus, an asset purchaser generally would not be liable as a successor 
unless one of these four exceptions applied. 20 The remainder of Part ill 
will briefly discuss each of these exceptions in the context of CERCLA. A 
more complete analysis of the various arguments for or against the applica-
tion of the traditional corporate law rule will be given in part IV. 
A. The Purchasing Corporation Expressly or Impliedly Agrees to 
Assume the Liability 
Whether or not a corporation assumed the liabilities of its predecessor 
is generally a concern of contract interpretation.21 "There has never been 
any doubt that an acquiring company could assume the target company's 
contingent future liabilities. "22 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of implied assumption of liabil-
ity by an asset purchaser in Louisiana-Pacific v. Asarco.23 However, the 
17. /d. at 288. 
18. City Management Corp. v. United States Chemical Co., 43 F.3d 224, 251 (6th Cir. 1994). 
19. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990). 
20. United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1992). 
21. Lisa Cope, Comment, Who Should Pay Cleanup Costs-The Federal Response to 
Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 549 (1992). 
22. RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1099 (1986). 
23. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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court declined to rule on this issue because the plaintiff failed to raise it at 
the district court level. Despite this, the court did offer some guidance 
when it stated that "the question of implied liability is a fact specific issue, 
and additional facts would have to be developed" at the district court level. 
Thus, it appears that a court may find an asset purchaser liable as a PRP 
under CERCLA if it can be shown that the purchaser impliedly assumed 
the liability.24 
In Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer East Inc.,25 the Third Circuit 
addressed the issue of express assumption of liability by an asset 
purchaser. The Beazer court held that the asset purchaser (Beazer) ex-
pressly assumed the liabilities of the now dissolved predecessor (AL T 
Corp.). ALT was the party actually responsible for the original contamina-
tion. In 1954 Beazer purchased the assets of ALT Corp. As part of the 
agreement Beazer expressly assumed all of the liabilities of ALT Corp. 
Because the agreement was found to be clear and unambiguous Beazer 
was deemed to have "assum[ed] 'all of the liabilities and obligations of 
[ALT Corp.] whatsoever.' "26 The court concluded that although the 
agreement occurred years before the existence of CERCLA, Beazer's as-
sumption of liability was sufficiently broad to include CERCLA liability.27 
Beazer argued that under Delaware law a corporation's liabilities cease 
to exist three years after dissolution. Since ALT was dissolved in 1957, its 
liabilities ceased with it. Therefore, Beazer argued, it should not be liable 
under CERCLA. The court agreed that under Delaware law a creditor can-
not enforce a corporate obligation three years after dissolution. However, 
the court held that this does not mean that "when a separate entity has re-
ceived assets of a dissolved corporation and assumed its corporate liabili-
ties, a creditor may not bring a suit to enforce that obligation against the 
continuing entity."28 The court held that Beazer "is an ongoing entity, with 
an existence separate from the dissolved corporation, which received cor-
porate assets and assumed corporate obligations, and which existed both at 
the time ALCOA and CBI's CERCLA claims arose."29 Thus, the court 
found that Beazer succeeded to ALT 's CERCLA liabilities by express as-
sumption.30 
24. See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 31 ERC 1997 (D. Del. 1990) (The court closely 
examined the purchasing agreement and held that there was an express assumption of liability and 
therefore the purchasing corporation was liable as PRP under CERCLA). 
25. 124 F.3d 551 (3d Cir. 1997). 
26. /d. at 555, (quoting A5158). 
27. !d. 
28. !d. 
29. /d. 
30. /d. at 16. 
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B. The Transaction Amounts to a 'De-facto' Consolidation or Merger 
An asset purchaser may be liable under the de-facto merger exception. 
In general, a transaction is in reality a de-facto merger when: 
(1) there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller in 
terms of continuity of management, personnel, physical loca-
tion, assets, and operations; 
(2) there is a continuity of shareholders; 
(3) the seller ceases operations, liquidates, and dissolves as 
soon as legally and practically possible; and 
( 4) the purchasing corporation assumes the obligations of the 
seller necessary for uninterrupted continuation of business 
operations. 31 
All four of these factors are required in order to find a de-facto merger?2 
The Ninth Circuit in Louisiana-Pacific held that a continuity of 
shareholders is essential in determining whether or not the transaction 
amounts to a de-facto merger?3 Continuity of shareholders occurs where 
an asset purchaser pays for the purchase with shares of stock. 34 Thus, the 
shareholders in the selling corporation continue to have an interest in the 
assets which they sold. 
In Louisiana-Pacific, the Asarco company operated a copper smelter 
in Washington State. Asarco was being sued by two PRP's, including In-
dustrial Mineral Products (IMP), "for recovery of costs incurred in 
cleaning up the release of hazardous waste."35 Asarco then sued L-Bar 
Inc., claiming L-Bar was a successor in interest to IMP because L-Bar had 
purchased all of the assets of IMP.36 Asarco claimed that L-Bar was the 
successor in interest to IMP under the de-facto exception. 
The court ruled that L-Bar, as an asset purchaser, was not a PRP under 
CERCLA. The court reasoned that although some of the seller's 
shareholders now held stock in the purchasing corporation, no stock was 
exchanged as part of the sale. The court found that there was no continuity 
of shareholders because stock was not used as part of the purchase price of 
the assets. The stock was bought independently on the open market by the 
shareholders in question. 37 
31. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1990); see also 
SmithKline Beecham v. Rohm & Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 162 n.6 (3d Cir. 1996). 
32. Cope, supra note 21, at 552. 
33. Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1265. 
34. !d. at 1264. 
35. !d. at 1262. 
36. /d. 
37. /d. at 1265. 
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C. The Transaction Was Fraudulently Entered Into in Order to Escape 
Liability. 
The rationale behind this exception is to avoid assets being transferred 
in an effort to defraud creditors.38 "The creditors defrauded by the transfer 
may, in equity, follow the property into the hands of the new corpora-
tion."39 
The issue of fraudulent transfers was discussed in relation to CERCLA 
in City Management Corp. v. U. S. Chemical Co. 40 In this case, City Man-
agement purchased the assets of U.S. Chemical. City Management then 
sued U.S. Chemical seeking a declaratory judgement stating that City 
Management, as an asset purchaser, was not liable for the seller's 
CERCLA liabilities.4I Other PRPs claimed that the asset purchase was 
fraudulent, and therefore City Management was potentially liable under 
CERCLA.42 The court determined that state law should apply and held that 
under the Michigan Fraudulent Conveyance Act the party alleging fraud 
must "show that the conveyance was made 'without fair consideration.' "43 
According to the Act, "fair consideration" does not require an exact 
equivalent, but only a fair equivalent of the value of the property.44 Thus, 
the court agreed with the district court's ruling that City Management's 
payment of $720,000 for U.S. Chemical's assets, valued at $1 million, did 
amount to fair consideration. Consequently this transaction did not violate 
Michigan's Fraudulent Conveyance Act. City Management was therefore 
not liable as a successor corporation under CERCLA.45 
D. The Purchasing Corporation Is Merely a Continuation of the Seller 
Corporation 
"The traditional 'mere continuation' exception to the general rule of 
purchaser non-liability 'encompas[es] the situation where one corporation 
sells its assets to another corporation with the same people owning both 
corporations.' "46 Essentially, under the "mere continuation" theory "a cor-
poration is not to be considered the continuation of a predecessor unless, 
after the transfer of assets, only one corporation remains, and there is an 
38. 15 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 7125 (penn. ed. rev. vol. 1990). 
39. !d. 
40. 43 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994). 
41. /d. at 249. 
42. /d. at 253. 
43. /d. at 254 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.15 (1990)). 
44. !d. (citing Mich. Comp. Laws§ 566.13(a) (1990)). 
45. /d. 
46. /d. at 251 (citing Turner v. bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 n.3 (Mich. 
1976)). 
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identity of stock, stockholders, and directors between the two corpora-
tions."47 
The "substantial continuity" test evolved from the "mere continuation" 
exception and is a more expansive approach to successor liability.48 Essen-
tially this approach considers the following factors to determine if there is 
a "substantial continuity" between the two corporations: 
(1) retention of the same employees; 
(2) retention of the same supervisory personnel; 
(3) retention of the same productions facilities in the same 
location; 
( 4) production of the same product; 
(5) retention of the same name; 
(6) continuity of assets; 
(7) continuity of general business operations; or 
(8) whether the successor holds itself out as the continuation of 
the previous enterprise.49 
The EPA has encouraged the use of this test in an effort to expand the 
number of potentially responsible parties under CERCLA. 50 This test goes 
beyond the four traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor 
corporation non-liability. 
IV. THREE CIRCUITS THAT HAVE APPLIED THE SUBSTANTIAL 
CONTINUITY DOCTRINE TO CERCLA ANALYSIS OF THE 
SUBSTANTIAL CONTINUITY DOCTRINE 
In United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., Carolina Transformer 
had a site, contaminated with polychorinated biphenyls (PCB's), which it 
had owned from 1959 to 1984.51 In 1984 the EPA ruled that there was a 
"threat of release of PCB' s into the environment" and therefore instructed 
Carolina Transformers to conduct cleanup operations.52 By the end of 
1984, Carolina Transformers had transferred most of its assets to 
FayTranCo.53 FayTranCo had been incorporated in 1979 and its board of 
directors consisted of former officers of Carolina Transformer. 54 The court 
ruled that the successor corporation (FayTranCo) would not have been lia-
47. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co .• 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992). 
48. United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1992). 
49. Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838. 
50. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
51. Carolina Transformer, 918 F.2d at 834. 
52. /d. at 835. 
53. /d. at 839. 
54. /d. at 835. 
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ble under a mere continuation theory because there was no overlap of 
shareholders between the two companies.55 However, the court did find 
FayTranCo liable under the more expansive "substantial continuity" ap-
proach.56 
The court reasoned that there was substantial continuity between 
FayTranCo and Carolina Transformers; therefore FayTranCo was liable as 
a PRP under CERCLA.57 The court found that nearly all of Carolina's em-
ployees and supervisors went to FayTranCo and performed the same jobs 
at the same salary. Also, FayTranCo produced the same product and ac-
quired most of the assets of Carolina Transformers. Finally, the former 
president of Carolina Transformers continued to have a substantial influ-
ence in the affairs of FayTranCo.58 The court stated that "[t]he record as a 
whole leaves the unmistakable impression that the transfer of the Carolina 
Transformer business to FayTranCo was part of an effort to continue the 
business in all material respects yet avoid the environmental liability aris-
ing from the PCB contamination .... "59 For this reason, the court felt jus-
tified in utilizing the broad substantial continuity approach.60 
The court determined that FayTranCo had purchased the assets of Car-
olina merely as a means to avoid CERCLA liability.61 The court stated that 
they were unwilling to allow a corporation to split off a part of its opera-
tion, which was responsible for the environmental contamination, and then 
continue the rest of its operations under a new name in order to avoid envi-
ronmentalliability. The court reasoned that "such a result ... would not 
serve the remedial purposes of CERCLA, nor would it further the Con-
gressional intent [ofCERCLA]."62 
In B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski,63 the Second Circuit commented on the 
remedial purposes of CERCLA. The court used the substantial continuity 
theory to impose successor liability upon various asset purchasers in order 
to "fulfill that purpose."64 In this case, hazardous waste had been deposited 
into two separate landfills in Connecticut.65 Numerous PRPs sought contri-
bution from numerous other PRPs. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of those defendants who claimed they were not liable as 
55. /d. at 838. 
56. /d. at 840. 
57. Jd. at 841. (The district court awarded response costs of $977,921.01 and punitive 
damages totaling three times that amount, or $2,933,376.03. Thus, the total cost amounted to 
$3,922,684.04). 
58. /d. at 841. 
59. /d. 
60. /d. 
61. /d. 
62. /d. at 840. 
63. 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996). 
64. /d. at 519. 
65. /d. at 51 I. 
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asset purchasers under traditional corporate law.66 The Second Circuit re-
versed the summary judgement ruling under the theory of "substantial con-
tinuity."67 The court ruled that since CERCLA was a remedial statute, it 
should be construed liberally in order to "give effect to its purposes."68 
These purposes "include facilitating efficient responses to environmental 
harm, holding responsible parties liable for the costs of the cleanup ... and 
encouraging settlements that reduce the inefficient expenditure of public 
funds on lengthy litigation."69 
Likewise, in United States v. Mexico Feed, the Eighth Circuit upheld 
the substantial continuity test finding it consistent with the goals of 
CERCLA. 70 Mexico Feed and Seed had previously leased land to Pierce 
Waste Oil Service (PWOS). PWOS stored waste oil in tanks located on the 
leased property. Over the years waste oil had either leaked or been spilled 
onto the property. In 1983, PWOS sold its assets to Moreco and later 
PWOS was dissolved. In 1984, the EPA cleaned up the site and then sued 
to recover its costs. Among others, the EPA sued Mexico Feed as the 
owner of the property. The EPA also sued Moreco by claiming Moreco 
was the successor of PWOS under the substantial continuity doctrine.71 
The court justified using the substantial continuity approach, because it felt 
CERCLA was directed at imposing liability upon those parties that are re-
sponsible; and this test would prevent responsible parties from escaping 
liability.72 The problem, the court reasoned, is this test could potentially 
hold non responsible parties liable for the cost of cleanup. The court dra-
matized its view of successor liability when it stated, "Congress could not 
have intended that those corporations be enabled to evade their responsi-
bility by dying paper deaths, only to rise phoenix-like from the ashes, 
transformed, but free of their former liabilities."73 
It is important to note that while the Mexico Feed court upheld the 
substantial continuity doctrine, it also found that the asset purchaser 
(Moreco) was not a substantial continuation of its predecessor (PWOS) 
and therefore not liable under CERCLA.74 The court held that the asset 
purchaser in this case (1) was a larger pre-existing corporation and did not 
consist entirely of the predecessor's assets, (2) had previously been a com-
petitor of the predecessor, and (3) had no notice of the contamination.75 
66. /d. at 513. 
67. /d. at 520. 
68. ld. at 514. 
69. ld. 
70. United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478, 488 (8th Cir. 1992). 
71. ld. at 483. 
72. /d. at 488. 
73. /d. at 487. 
74. /d. at 490. 
75. /d. at 489. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTANTIAL CONTINUITY DOCTRINE 
The facts of the preceding cases would seem to justify application of 
the substantial continuity doctrine in CERCLA, because it appears that 
without such a broad test a responsible party may escape liability. How-
ever, closer examination reveals significant flaws in the reasoning support-
ing this broad interpretation of successor liability. Utilization of this test 
would require the fashioning of federal common law because of the gen-
eral rule that asset purchasers are not liable as successor corporations un-
less one of the four traditional exceptions applies. 
A. Improperly Fashioning Federal Common Law 
1. The Anspec court's analysis 
In Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 76 the Sixth Circuit Court 
noted that a successor corporation would be liable under CERCLA. 
However, it is important to note that an asset purchaser is not necessarily a 
successor corporation. In 1978, Anspec purchased land with improvements 
from Ultraspherics Corp. In 1987, Ultraspherics merged with Hoover 
Group, which was designated as the surviving corporation of 
Ultraspherics. Prior to selling the land to Anspec, Ultraspherics deposited 
hazardous waste into various underground and above ground tanks located 
on the property. As a result of this disposal, hazardous waste was "rou-
tinely released into the soil and ground water.'m In its decision, the court 
concluded that there is an important distinction that must be made "be-
tween interpreting a statute and fashioning federal common law.''78 Simi-
larly, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "the authority to construe a 
statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule 
or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt."79 
Prior to the circuit court's ruling in Anspec, the district court deter-
mined that including the term "successor corporation" within the definition 
of "person" would, in effect, be fashioning federal common law and fed-
eral common law cannot be formed when the statute is clear and unambig-
uous.80 
The Sixth Circuit held that § 101 (21) of CERCLA clearly defines who 
is liable as a "person" under§ 107(a)_BI Although Congress did not specifi-
cally include "successor corporations" within the definition of "person" 
(under CERCLA § 101(21)), the court ruled that the definition of "person" 
76. 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991). 
77. ld. at 1243. 
78. ld. at 1246. 
79. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981). 
80. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1244. 
81. ld. 
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under CERCLA 101(21) includes the term "corporation," and there is a 
"universally accepted rule that a reference to liability of corporations in-
cludes successors."82 The court added, "[w]e are not creating or fashioning 
federal common law when we adopt an interpretation of a statute that is in 
harmony with a universally accepted rule of law."83 This universally ac-
cepted rule includes successor corporations within the term corporation. 84 
The court held that it was merely interpreting a word within the statute "to 
include one of its generally accepted components."85 
However, utilization of the substantial continuity test to find asset pur-
chasers liable as successor corporations would require the fashioning of 
federal common law since asset purchasers generally do not incur succes-
sor liability.86 As discussed previously in Part III of this Comment, under 
traditional state corporate law an asset purchaser only becomes a liable 
successor when one or more of the four recognized exceptions applies. 87 
And while the "mere continuation" exception is one of the four recognized 
exceptions, the broader "substantial continuation" exception is not.88 In-
deed, the "substantial continuation" exception is not recognized at all in 
most states.89 Thus, by expanding the definition of successor corporations 
to include asset purchasers, the courts are fashioning federal common law. 
It is universally accepted "that a corporation that purchases the assets of 
another corporation does not, simply by virtue of the asset purchase trans-
action[], become liable for the obligations of the seller. "90 
It should be noted, however, that whether Hoover was a liable succes-
sor under state law was not at issue in Anspec. An applicable Michigan 
statute provided that any corporation surviving a merger took on all liabili-
ties of every party to the merger.91 Hoover was the designated survivor and 
so, under the statute, it was the liable successor. Had there been no Michi-
gan statute on point, the court would have had to look to traditional state 
corporate law to find Hoover liable as a successor under the de-facto 
merger exception or, that failing, fashion a new federal common law rule 
holding Hoover liable as a mere asset purchaser. As it was, the court sim-
ply applied the state statute to find that Hoover was a liable successor and 
82. /d. at 1246. 
83. /d. 
84. /d. 
85. /d. 
86. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 1997 WL 792675, *I (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 36-48. 
89. See Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *5. 
90. /d. 
91. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.1834(e) (1990)). 
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then addressed the disputed issue whether a liable successor under state 
law is a PRP under CERCLA. 
For these reasons the formation of a federal common law, in the 
context of asset purchasers, must be examined closely. It is one thing to 
extend CERCLA liability, as the Anspec court did, to an asset purchaser 
whom traditional state corporate law deems to be a liable successor. It is an 
altogether different thing to take the next step of extending CERCLA lia-
bility, as courts applying the substantial continuation test have done, to an 
asset purchaser whom traditional state corporate law has never deemed to 
be a liable successor. In Louisiana-Pacific the Ninth Circuit held that 
"Congress expected the courts to develop a federal common law to supple-
ment [CERCLA]."92 However, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. 
Brown & Bryant, Inc., the Ninth Circuit diverged from its prior opinion in 
Louisiana-Pacific and held that there was "no need for a federal common 
law of successor liability under CERCLA, and that state law supplies the 
rule of decision in this area."93 
2. The Atchison court's analysis 
In Atchison, Brown & Bryant, Inc. operated a agricultural chemical 
business on property leased to it by Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rail-
way. In the mid 1980's, state and federal agencies began investigating the 
property for contamination and ultimately required Brown & Bryant to 
clean up the site. Since Brown & Bryant could not afford the entire cost of 
the cleanup, the EPA required the Railway company, as owners of the 
land, to pay the balance. Brown & Bryant realized that it could not afford 
the cost of the required cleanup and decided to sell the business to its 
competitors. One half of Brown & Bryant's equipment was sold to 
PureGro. Subsequently the Railway company sued PureGro as a PRP, 
claiming PureGro was a successor in interest.94 
In Atchison, the Ninth Circuit cites two Supreme Court cases95 which 
"call into question the ease with which Louisiana-Pacific created a set of 
federal rules .... These cases counsel that the need for such special fed-
eral rules will be only in 'few and restricted instances.' "96 The court rea-
soned that before fashioning a federal common law, courts should first 
look at "whether Congress intended federal judges to develop their own 
rules or to incorporate state law .... If there is no congressional directive, 
92. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990). 
93. Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *1. 
94. /d. at * 1-2. 
95. See O'Me1veney & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) and Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S.Ct. 
666 (U.S. 1997). 
96. Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *3 (citation omitted). 
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then a court should tum to the three part test articulated in United States v. 
Kimbell Foods, lnc."97 The court in Atchison concluded that since 
"CERCLA lacks any clear directive that federal court develop standards 
for successor liability,"98 courts must tum to the Kimbell Foods test in or-
der to determine whether a supplemental federal rule, such as the substan-
tial continuity approach, is necessary. We tum now to an examination of 
the Kimbell Foods test. 
3. Factors for determining whether fashioning federal common law is 
improper 
In Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court noted that only under certain 
circumstances should federal common law be fashioned. The court must 
determine (a) whether the law requires a "nationally uniform body of law;" 
(b) whether "application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of 
the federal program ... ; and (c) to what "extent ... application of a fed-
eral rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state 
law."99 
a. Whether there is a need for a nationally uniform body of law. As 
noted earlier, those courts applying the substantial continuity approach 
have argued that application of traditional corporate law would frustrate 
the remedial purposes of CERCLA. However, "neither the language nor 
the legislative history of CERCLA provides a basis for concluding that the 
creation of a uniform federal common law rule of successorship liability 
was intended."100 In addition, it is apparent that application of the tradi-
tional corporate law regarding asset purchasers would not hinder a national 
uniform body of law. After all, there is already a universal acceptance of 
the traditional view that asset purchasers are not liable as successors unless 
one of the four exceptions applies. 101 "Without a showing that state law is 
inadequate to achieve the federal interest, 'we discern no imperative need 
to develop a general body of federal common law to decide cases such as 
this.' "102 Thus, by fashioning a new federal common law, the courts which 
have applied the substantial continuity approach have actually disrupted 
the national uniformity which already existed. Indeed, if the courts' pri-
97. !d. at 3. (citing U.S. v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979)). 
98. Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *4. 
99. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29. 
100. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, 
Circuit Justice, concurring). 
101. City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical Co., 43 F.3d 224, 251 (6th Cir. 1994). 
102. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1249 (Kennedy, Circuit Justice, concurring) (quoting Wilson v. 
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 673, (1979). 
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mary concern was to foster national uniformity, then the courts should 
have utilized traditional corporate law as it already existed. 103 
In Carolina Transformer, the court argued in favor of applying the 
substantial continuity test because of the "national interest in the uniform 
enforcement of CERCLA."104 It is difficult to understand how the court 
concluded this in light of the fact that a majority of states currently utilize 
traditional corporate law regarding the liability of asset purchasers under 
Superfund.105 
[T]he law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and suc-
cessor liability is largely uniform . . . . The argued 'need' for 
uniformity thus stems not from disarray among the various 
states, but from the alleged need for a more expansive view of 
successor liability than state law currently provides-in other 
words, the notion that state law on this issue is inadequate for 
CERCLA's purposes. 106 
The Supreme Court has ruled that implementation of federal common 
law requires a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest 
and the use of state law."107 In Atchison the court reasoned that to 
demonstrate "such a conflict, more than speculation is required-there must 
be a 'specific, concrete federal policy or interest that is compromised' by 
the application of state law."108 Thus the court found no reason in Atchison 
to develop a federal law simply to provide a more expansive view of suc-
cessor liability. 
b. Whether application of the traditional corporate law of successor 
liability would frustrate the purposes of CERCLA. Each of the circuits 
which applied the substantial continuity approach to CERCLA argued that 
traditional corporate law would frustrate the intent of Congress, which is to 
impose the cleanup costs on the responsible parties rather than the taxpay-
ers.109 
In Carolina Transformer, the court was concerned that FayTranCo 
(who purchased the assets of Carolina Transformer) would not be liable 
under the traditional rules of successor liability. 110 Apparently FayTranCo 
103. ld. (The court states "the law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor 
liability is largely uniform"). 
104. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992). 
I 05. See supra note 1. 
106. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 1997 WL 792675, *4 (citing 
Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1991). 
107. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994). 
108. Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *5 (citing O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87). 
109. See Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 837; United States v. Mexico Feed 980 F.2d 478, 
487 (8th Cir. 1992); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996). 
110. Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838. 
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was fraudulently formed merely to avoid CERCLA liability, and thus the 
court felt it necessary to utilize the substantial continuity approach in order 
to hold FayTranCo liable. However, the Atchison court reasoned that "[i]n 
the cases in which the broader exception has been applied to hold an asset 
purchaser liable, there has almost always been some fraudulent intent and 
collusion present, in which case the purchaser would have likely already 
have been liable under another traditional exception-the fraudulently-en-
tered transaction exception."IJI The court then cited Carolina Transformer 
as just such an example. 
It is important to note that the owners and operators of FayTranCo 
were the same owners and operators of Carolina Transformer. Thus, these 
individuals could be, and ultimately were held to be, personally liable as 
corporate officers of Carolina Transformer. The result was that the respon-
sible parties were held liable for the cost of the cleanup even without the 
use of the substantial continuity test. 
"To date, the EPA has focused its efforts, with considerable success, 
on holding corporate officers and shareholders liable directly under 
CERCLA ... by proving that they personally owned and operated the fa-
cility, or that they personally arranged for the disposal of hazardous sub-
stances."112 In Carolina Transformer, the court found two corporate offi-
cers liable as "owners" and "operators" of Carolina Transformers under 
CERCLA 107(a)(l). Therefore, these two officers were jointly and sever-
ally liable for the cost of the clean-up, and the taxpayers were not bur-
dened with the cost of the cleanup. 
The standard for liability of corporate officers is rather broad. To 
qualify as an "operator" does not require one to exercise actual control, 
rather a majority of the courts have adopted the "authority to control" stan-
dard to determine officer liability. 113 Thus, it is more likely that the govern-
ment will be able to find a party liable for the cleanup, such as a corporate 
officer, and avoid burdening the taxpayers. 
In determining corporate officers' liability, the court considers the ex-
tent of "the corporate officer's ownership and control of the corporation; 
whether or not the corporate officer is in charge of day to day 
operations ... whether or not the corporate officer could have prevented, 
abated, or stopped the contamination."114 Another theory of corporate offi-
cer liability considers the: 
corporate officer's supervision and control over the handling 
and disposal of hazardous substances; the nature and degree 
Ill. Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *5. 
112. 4 BATTLE & l.JPELES, supra note 4, at 276 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (1994)). 
ll3. /d. 
114. FOGLEMAN, supra note 10, at 196. 
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of knowledge, responsibility, opportunity, and involvement in 
the disposal process; the individual's corporate status, man-
agement duties, percentage ownership of shares, position in 
the corporation's hierarchy; and responsibility for hazardous 
waste disposal activities including possible illegal disposal 
activities.115 
367 
Under these theories it would be very difficult for a corporate officer 
to escape liability under circumstances similar to Carolina Transformer. 
Thus, it is unlikely that the taxpayers will be burdened with the cost of 
cleanup simply because the asset purchasers are not liable for the cleanup. 
Any party (including a corporate officer) who is found to be liable is 
jointly and severally liable for the entire cost of the cleanup. 116 
In Mexico Feed, the Eighth Circuit stated that one of CERCLA's es-
sential purposes was to hold responsible parties liable. 117 Although the 
court applied the substantial continuity approach, it found that the asset 
purchaser was not a substantial continuation of the predecessor corpora-
tion. The court reasoned that the purchaser; (1) had been a competitor of 
the selling corporation, (2) had no notice of the potential liability, and (3) 
pre-existed the sale and was a larger corporation then the predecessor. 118 It 
is thus evident that application of the traditional corporate rule would not 
frustrate the federal purposes of CERCLA in this case, since application of 
the traditional rule would have reached the same result. That is, under ei-
ther the traditional theory or the substantial continuity approach, the asset 
purchaser would not have been liable. 
In addition, "CERCLA does not require that federal law displace state 
laws governing corporate existence and vicarious liability unless the state 
laws permit action prohibited by the Act, or unless 'their application 
would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of ac-
tion.' " 119 In determining whether or not a state law is inconsistent with 
federal policy, the Supreme Court has stated that there must be some 
"concrete evidence that adopting state law would adversely affect [federal 
interests]."120 Thus, "generalized pleas for uniformity" are not, by them-
selves, sufficient to determine inconsistency between state law and federal 
policy. 121 "CERCLA 'provides a mechanism for cleaning up hazardous-
waste sites ... and imposes the costs of the cleanup on those responsible 
115. ld. at 197. 
116. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(l) (1994). 
117. United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1992). 
118. !d. at 489. 
119. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, 
Circuit Justice, concuning) (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975)). 
120. !d. (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979)). 
121. !d. at 1250. 
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for the contamination' .... There is no evidence that the application of 
state corporation law will frustrate this objective."122 
There is a concern that some states might engage in a "race to the bot-
tom" by having less stringent environmental laws than other states, in or-
der to attract corporate business. However, as one circuit judge noted, 
"[s]tates have a substantial interest in protecting their citizens and state 
resources. Most states have their own counterparts to CERCLA and the 
EPA and they share a complementary interest with the United States in 
enforcement of laws like CERCLA ... .''123 Thus it is unlikely that a state 
would sacrifice the health and safety of its citizens in order to attract 
businesses, and currently "[n]o state provides a haven for liable compa-
nies. Nor is there reason to think that states will alter their existing succes-
sor liability rules in a 'race to the bottom' to attract corporate business. " 124 
c. Whether the application of the substantial continuity test would 
disrupt the purposes of traditional corporate law. Application of the sub-
stantial continuity approach would frustrate the commercial relationships 
which are predicated on state law. The general rule of non-liability of asset 
purchasers developed in order to "facilitate the fluid transfer of corporate 
assets.''125 The "public has a substantial interest in the free transfer of capi-
tal and the reorganization of unprofitable businesses. Imposing liability on 
a successor, when a predecessor could have provided no relief whatsoever, 
is likely to severely inhibit the reorganization of, or transferring of the as-
sets of, a failing business."126 Finally, the "fluidity of corporate assets ... 
is impeded if assets [which are] sold piecemeal are each encumbered by 
the liabilities of their previous owner. "127 Under CERCLA there is a tre-
mendous incentive to avoid liability. If a corporation could be liable under 
CERCLA merely because it purchased the assets of another corporation, 
the fluidity of asset transfers will be seriously impeded as illustrated by the 
"brownfields" problem. 
The brownfields problem concerns corporations seeking to build in-
dustrial sites facing "strong disincentives to selecting previously developed 
urban industrial sites, or brownfields."128 The problem is that companies 
will prefer to build on previously undeveloped land rather then face poten-
122. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 1997 WL 792675, *5 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 
123. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1250. 
124. Atchison, 1997 WL 792675, at *5 (citing Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1250). 
125. Upholsterers' lnt'l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323, 
1326 (7th Cir. 1990). 
126. Musikiwarnba v. EESI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 750-51 (7th Cir. 1985). 
127. EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 945 (7th Cir. 1988). 
128. Brian C. Walsh, Seeding the Brown.fields: a Proposed Statute limiting Environmental 
Liability for Prospective Purchasers, 34 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 191, 191 (1997). 
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tial liability under CERCLA.129 Thus, many urban sites are unable to be 
sold and remain vacant or underutilized. 130 It is estimated that there are as 
many as 450,000 brownfield sites nationwide. 131 
A problem similar to the brownfields could occur with respect to asset 
purchasers. Parties will be unwilling to purchase the assets of a corporation 
who is potentially liable under CERCLA. It has been argued that the pur-
chase price could be adjusted to reflect the potential liability. However, 
because PRP's under CERCLA are jointly and severally liable, the liability 
could very well exceed the cost of the assets, as one party could be forced 
to pay the cost of the entire cleanup. For this reason it would be very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for the purchase price to reflect the potential 
CERCLA liability. Thus, the application of the substantial continuity ap-
proach may adversely affect the fluidity of asset transfers much like cur-
rent environmental law has led to the brownfields problem. 
Corporations are created under state laws and "[t]hose state laws de-
fine [the corporations'] powers, rights, and liabilities, prescribe their pro-
cedures, govern their continued existence, and define the terms upon 
which mergers may occur and the effect to be given to mergers."132 Thus, 
corporations are generally formed, and continue to be governed under state 
law throughout their existence. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state 
that the "capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by 
the law under which it was organized."133 In addition, CERCLA "provides 
that claims for contribution shall be brought 'in accordance with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.' "134 State law should continue to govern 
corporate liabilities since the corporation came into existence under, and 
continues to be governed by, state law. 
Finally, the court in Atchison determined that under the Kimbell test 
there was no justification for the creation of a federal common law. 
Since the states already have rules in place to prevent the 
use of the corporate form to avoid liability, the only possible 
justification for a new federal (and more expansive) rule is to 
'enrich the fund' by imposing liability on more asset purchas-
ers .... As the Court pointed out in O'Melveny, these 'more 
money' arguments are unavailing .... 
O'Melveny and Atherton reaffirm the Kimbell Foods anal-
ysis and clarify the difficulty of proving the need for a federal 
rule of decision. The imposition of liability under any statute 
129. /d. 
130. ld. at 198. 
131. /d. 
132. See supra note 82. 
133. FED. R. Crv. P. 17(b). 
134. See supra note 82. 
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"involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and 
appraised .... Within the federal system, at least, we have 
decided that that function of weighing and appraising is more 
appropriately for those who write laws, rather than for those 
who interpret them."135 
B. Application of the Substantial Continuity Test in Labor and Products 
Liability Law Cases Does Not Justify its Application in CERCLA Cases. 
The substantial continuity test, or approaches similar to it, have been 
used in the context of labor law and products liability. 136 However, it will 
be shown that the reasoning supporting application of these broad tests in 
labor and products liability law cases does not support applying this test to 
CERCLA liability. In addition, CERCLA liability is potentially far more 
extensive than that of either labor or products liability law. 
1. Labor law and CERCLA distinguished 
The substantial continuity test stems from a U.S. Supreme Court ruling 
in Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 131 a case relating to labor law. The 
Court ruled that an employer who purchases the assets of a predecessor 
could be liable under the National Labor Relations Act for the predeces-
sor's unlawful discharge of an employee. The Court justified the applica-
tion of the substantial continuity approach by balancing the interests of 
"the bona fide successor, the public, and the affected employee."138 The 
Court concluded that the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act out-
weighed the interest of the purchaser because: (1) there is minimal cost to 
the purchaser; (2) the potential liability may be reflected in the price the 
purchaser pays for the business; or (3) the purchaser may indemnify itself 
with a clause in the sales contract. 
The liability for unlawfully discharging one employee in Golden State 
Bottling is vastly different from the potential liability under CERCLA. Re-
alistically, the cost of clean up and other damages under Superfund can 
greatly exceed the price originally paid for the assets. Often the cost of 
clean up amounts to millions, if not tens of millions, of dollars. 139 Also, it 
135. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 1997 WL 792675, *5 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (citing O'Melveney & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994)). 
136. United States v. Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d 478, 487-88 (8th Cir 1992). 
137. 414 U.S. 168 (1973). 
138. !d. at 181. 
139. See, SmithK.Iine Beecham v. Rohm & Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 157 (3rd Cir. 1996) 
(estimated clean up costs amounting to $123 million); City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical Co., 
43 F.3d 224, 247 (6th Cir. 1994) (response costs amounting to $44 million); Ninth Avenue Remedial 
Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 B.R. 716, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1996) (clean up costs 
exceeding $20 million); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 512 (2nd Cir. 1996) (settlement 
by one party alone amounted to $5,375,000); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 
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must be remembered that PRP's are jointly and severally liable under 
CERCLA. Thus, the asset purchaser could potentially be liable for the en-
tire cost of the cleanup. 140 Additionally, the price of the clean up often ex-
ceeds the value of the assets purchased, regardless of the purchase price. 
For this reason the purchase price may not be able to be adequately 
adjusted to fully compensate for any potential loss, and this in tum would 
likely hinder the fluidity of assets. 141 "Neither CERCLA nor the EPA's 
accompanying regulations specifies a consistent standard for determining 
what constitutes a sufficient cleanup of contaminated property. As a result, 
any estimate of cleanup costs is necessarily imprecise."142 Thus, there is a 
risk that "an agency official overseeing a cleanup may require significantly 
more expensive procedures than the purchaser estimated."143 
Finally, the court noted in Golden State that, in regards to labor law, 
the purchaser can protect himself against potential liability through an in-
demnification clause in the sales contract. 144 While it is true that parties 
can also attempt to allocate cleanup costs among themselves, under 
CERCLA they will remain jointly and severally liable to the government 
for the entire cost of the cleanup. 145 
To summarize, the justifications for applying the substantial continuity 
approach to labor law simply do not apply to CERCLA. The cost of 
cleanup is usually not minimal, but rather often amounts to millions of dol-
lars. Also, the price of the cleanup cannot adequately be reflected in the 
purchase price of the assets because the cleanup price is (1) difficult to 
estimate and (2) may exceed the cost of the assets. Finally, the parties are 
not able to indemnify themselves against liability in the same way that par-
ties can in the case of labor law because, under CERCLA, the parties re-
main jointly and severally liable to the government, regardless of any in-
demnity clause. 
2. Products liability law and CERCLA distinguished 
Under products liability law, a few state courts have adopted more ex-
pansive rules of successor liability beyond the four traditional exceptions 
to non-liability. Two similar exceptions have developed, namely the "con-
tinuity of enterprise" exception, adopted by the Michigan Supreme 
832, 841 (4th Cir. 1992) (response costs plus punitive damages amounting to nearly $4 million). 
140. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 89 F.3d at 158. 
141. Upholsterers' Int'I Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323, 
1326 (7th Cir. 1990). 
142. Walsh, supra note 128, at 199. 
143. /d. 
144. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 186 (1973). 
145. Smithk/ine Beecham Corp., 89 F.3d at 158. 
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Court, 146 and the "product line" exception, adopted by the California Su-
preme Court.147 While the "continuity of enterprise" theory is more similar 
to the "substantial continuity" theory, both products liability tests will of-
ten reach similar results.148 Without discussing the details of either view, 
suffice it to say that both rules "permit liability to be imposed on an eco-
nomic entity distinct from the predecessor."149 
Essentially these rules were created out of a "concern for the plight of 
products liability claimants [who had] no entity to sue."15° Conversely, the 
EPA does not seek to use the substantial continuity test because they lack 
entities to sue, but because they desire more entities to sue. 151 Furthermore, 
nearly every other state has rejected both of these more expansive views of 
successor liability, and the application of an expanded view of successor 
liability is declining with regard to products liability. 152 Despite this, some 
federal courts are implementing the substantial continuity test with regard 
to CERCLA liability and citing the products liability arena for support of 
this broad interpretation. 153 
The courts that have rejected the "product line" exception have cited 
various reasons. First, the product line exception would amount to "an im-
position of liability without corresponding duty."154 Second, such a theory 
poses a serious risk to small businesses because of the difficulty in obtain-
ing adequate insurance for a predecessors' product defects. 155 And third, 
such a radical change from corporate law should be left to the legisla-
ture.156 
Likewise courts that have rejected the "continuity of enterprise" theory 
of products liability have done so for a variety of reasons. First, the succes-
sor corporation did not place the defective product onto the market and 
therefore did not create the risk. 157 Second, profit received from the defec-
tive product is "received in a remote way;" thus a purchaser does not di-
rectly benefit from the predecessor's defective product. 158 Third, "the suc-
cessor has not represented to the public the safety of the predecessor's 
146. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Mich. 1976). 
147. Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 5 (Cal. 1977). 
148. Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, 808 F.2d 848, 858 (1st Cir. 1986). 
149. Michael D. Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to Products Liability 
and An Alterative Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 897, 909 (1993). 
150. ld. 
151. See supra note 17 
152. /d. 
153. /d. 
154. Alfred R. Light, "Product Line" and "Continuity of Enterprise" Theories of Corporate 
Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 11 MISS. C. L. REV. 63, 69 (1990). 
155. ld. 
156. ld. 
157. /d. at 74. 
158. ld. 
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product."159 Finally, other courts have noted that a successor does notre-
ceive any profit or benefit from a predecessor's product, the successor 
does not create the risk, the predecessor is not able to "enhance the safety 
of a product already on the market,"160 and such a theory poses an "eco-
nomic threat to small businesses."161 
These same arguments against expanding successor liability in prod-
ucts liability cases apply to CERCLA liability as well. For example, 
"corporate successors have not created the risk of environmental harm un-
der CERCLA and do not benefit from the predecessor's previous waste 
disposal practices. A successor is normally not in a position to lessen the 
danger of environmental problems ... "caused by the predecessor. 162 Also, 
the EPA is never left without a means of paying for the cleanup. It can 
seek payment from other PRPs or the Superfund itself. After all, 
"CERCLA specifically provides for a fund to cover situations where there 
are no liable parties."163 It is not for the courts to impose liability where 
liability was not intended. Additionally, such a broad policy would pose an 
economic threat to all businesses, both small and large, because it would 
hamper the fluidity of transfers of corporate assets due to the threat of tre-
mendous liability. 164 For the foregoing reasons the use of the "product 
line" and "continuity of enterprise" theories are not valid justifications to 
hold asset purchasers liable under CERCLA beyond the traditional corpo-
rate law exceptions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In an effort to expand the reach of CERCLA, the EPA has tried to in-
crease the number of PRP's in order to find "deep pockets" to help fund 
the cost of cleanup. 165 Recognizing that under traditional corporate law 
successor liability does not generally extend to asset purchasers, the EPA 
has sought implementation of the "substantial continuity test." It has been 
argued that under the traditional corporate law many PRP' s would escape 
liability, thus frustrating the remedial purpose of CERCLA that responsi-
ble parities should pay the cost of cleanup. However, under a traditional 
cash for assets transfer of property, the successor "is a distinct entity with 
no involvement in hazardous waste disposal, other than its purchase of as-
sets that belonged to the responsible party."166 Nevertheless, some courts 
159. /d. 
160. /d. at 75. 
161. /d. 
162. /d. at 78. 
163. !d. at 79. 
164. See supra note 127. 
165. BATTLE & LiPELES, supra note I, at 275. 
166. Green, supra note 149, at 916. 
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have cited the broad interpretations under labor and products liability law 
in an effort to justify application of the substantial continuity theory to 
CERCLA liability. However, these analogies fail primarily because of the 
potentially enormous liability under CERCLA. As one author noted, "de-
spite concerns about the federal budget deficit, we have not yet stooped to 
random selection of wealthy entities to assume pieces of the governments 
liabilities. Yet imposing liberal successor liability ... does exactly that. In 
effect CERCLA becomes a gun-toting lunatic who randomly fires financial 
bullets at those unfortunate enough to stray in the vicinity."167 
Curtis J. Busby 
167. ld. 
